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Ever since Lord Hoffmann’s authoritative restatement of the principles relating to the 
interpretation of contracts in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building 
Society,1  various common law courts and academics have weighed in with their views on two 
main issues: whether the contextual approach articulated in Investors in fact represents a 
step forward from the traditional literal approach; and, accepting the operation of the 
contextual approach, whether there remains room for the exclusion of certain extrinsic 
evidence in interpreting contracts. But the foremost consideration underpinning these issues 
is that of the perceived uncertainty which the contextual approach brings. The Singapore 
High Court in Soon Kok Tiang v DBS Bank Ltd2 added its voice to the growing list of local 
cases grappling with contractual interpretation. In doing so, it may provide an opportunity 
for the further refinement of the principles relating to contractual interpretation in 
Singapore.  
 
Facts and decision 
Soon Kok Tiang concerned the action by investors of a series of callable basket credit-linked 
notes known as “DBS High Notes 5” (“the HN5”) to recover their investment sums under the 
said notes. The HN5 had been terminated due to the global financial crisis in 2008. The 
defendant bank informed the plaintiffs that no sum would be due or payable to them because 
of this. This rendered the plaintiffs’ investments in the HN5 worthless.  
The plaintiffs’ legal strategy to recover their investment was to argue that the HN5 were void 
at the time of their issuance and that the principal sums they had paid ought therefore to be 
returned to them. The HN5 were said to be void because a material term of the contract 
underlying the HN5, which concerns the calculation of the sum payable in the event of early 
termination, was uncertain. It was uncertain because (it was argued) four possible (and 
contradictory) methods of calculation were included in various parts of a document known 
as the “Pricing Statement”. The Pricing Statement was one of the documents distributed to 
interested investors. Key to resolving this issue was identifying which parts of the Pricing 
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1 [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
2 [2010] SGHC 360 (“Soon Kok Tiang”). 
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Statement were included in the eventual contract in respect of the HN5. Only if the entire 
Pricing Statement formed the contract was it possible to argue that there was any 
contradiction between the methods of calculation. Having decided that the point of offer was 
when the interested investor submitted the requisite Application Form, the High Court ruled 
that one had to look at the terms of the Application Form to decide if the Pricing Statement 
was incorporated in its entirety or just partly. The crucial section of the Application Form 
was Section B, which read: 
This is an application for DBS High Notes 5 (SGD Tranche Notes), a medium-term structured 
note of 5.5-year tenor designed to be held to maturity. I/We have read, acknowledged and 
agreed with the Terms and Conditions on the reverse of this form and the Terms and 
Conditions set out in DBS High Notes 5 Pricing Statement in particular Appendix A – Terms 
and Conditions and Procedures for Application, Acceptance and Cancellation before signing. 
I/We was/were advised to ensure that I/we have assessed suitability of the product against 
my/our risk attitude, financial means, and investment objectives. Please debit my/our 
account for the application of DBS High Notes 5 (SGD Tranche Notes) according to my/our 
instructions above. I/We confirm that the information provided above is complete, true and 
accurate. [emphasis added by the court] 
The interpretation issue concerned the meaning of the words “Terms and Conditions set out 
in DBS High Notes 5 Pricing Statement in particular Appendix A”. According to the 
defendant, this expression was meant to include only those parts in the Pricing Statement 
with the heading “Terms and Conditions”. In contrast, the plaintiffs’ position was that this 
expression included the entire Pricing Statement and rendered everything in the Statement 
as “Terms and Conditions” in the HN5 contract. 
On this point, the High Court decided for the plaintiffs. (However, it did eventually rule in 
favour of the defendant overall on the basis that there was no contradiction in a material 
term of the contract, and hence the contract was not void.) Concentrating solely on the 
interpretation issue, two points arise from the Court’s decision that warrant further 
discussion. 
Two points arising from the High Court’s decision 
What is the admissible background evidence? 
The first point concerns the admissible background evidence. The High Court, after referring 
to the important Court of Appeal decision of Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold 
Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd,3 proceeded to consider the background knowledge 
which informed both parties on the HN5 contract. One key document was the “Base 
Prospectus”, which was (again) issued to interested investors. There were, however, varying 
versions of the Base Prospectus, each of which seem to support either party’s argument on 
the interpretation issue. The Court preferred the version submitted by the plaintiff on the 
basis that it could not have access to the other versions which were in the exclusive 
possession of the defendant.  
The Court’s approach, with respect, must be correct. Both parties must commonly know the 
relevant background information. In preferring one party’s version over another, the Court’s 
approach must not be mistaken for preferring the subjective intentions of one party over the 
other, something expressly forbidden either under Lord Hoffmann’s restatement or the 
Court of Appeal’s approach in Zurich Insurance. However, one point of interest is that the 
defendant’s preferred version was “registered with the Monetary Authority of Singapore”. If, 
by doing so, that version had become part of the public domain, then that version must be 
taken to be relevant common background information since the test is not whether the 
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plaintiffs actually knew about this, but whether a reasonable person in the plaintiffs’ position 
ought to have been taken to know about this particular version. As Lord Hoffmann said in 
Investors Compensation:4 
The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact”, but this 
phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include. 
Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties … it 
includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the 
document would have been understood by a reasonable man. [emphasis added] 
Thus in Scott v Martin,5 a planning permission in existence at the date of the conveyance 
was admissible in evidence. It was a public document that could have been available to a 
purchaser of land.  
Whether context behind contract must clearly render language of contract ambiguous 
before departure from plain meaning is allowed?  
The second point concerns the High Court’s invocation of the Court of Appeal’s “threshold 
requirement” in Zurich Insurance that the contractual context must be clear and obvious, 
and render the contractual language ambiguous before departure from plain language is 
allowed. The Court reasoned that the use of the words “in particular” in the disputed 
expression “Terms and Conditions set out in DBS High Notes 5 Pricing Statement in 
particular Appendix A” conveyed a plain meaning that the entire Pricing Statement was 
incorporated as terms and conditions of the HN5 contract. (Appendix A contained the terms 
and conditions and procedures for application, acceptance and cancellation.) To elaborate, 
the “Terms and Conditions” section of the Pricing Statement makes no mention of Appendix 
A. However, the words “in particular” include Appendix A. What then was Appendix A part 
of? It could not have been part of the “Terms and Conditions” section of the Pricing 
Statement since that section did not make reference to Appendix A. Appendix A must 
therefore be part of the entire Pricing Statement. Thus, the disputed expression referred to 
the entire Pricing Statement, with especial highlighting of Appendix A. Since the background 
evidence was equivocal and did not suggest an alternative meaning, the plain meaning 
prevailed.  
As is well known presently, the Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance reaffirmed the 
Singapore courts’ endorsement of Lord Hoffmann’s restatement and established the 
threshold requirement mentioned above. At its core, the decision is representative of the 
reluctance of other common law courts to fully embrace the contextual approach on the 
notion of “uncertainty”. To the extent that an equivocal adoption of the contextual approach 
promotes uncertainty in approach inasmuch as it does uncertainty in result, perhaps the 
“threshold requirement” might be refined sometime in the future for the following reasons. 
First, the Court of Appeal appeared to draw a distinction between “plain” and “non-plain” 
meaning when it alluded to the need for the “threshold requirement” to be fulfilled before a 
departure from the plain language could be sanctioned. This distinction is not new and, 
indeed, was indirectly referred to by Lord Mustill in Charter Reinsurance v Fagan6 when he 
said that the interpretive process would usually start and end with the ordinary meaning of 
the words used. The problem with this distinction is that there is only one true meaning 
under the contextual approach, ie, the contextual meaning.7 In fact, in ascertaining the 
“plain” meaning of words, the High Court in Soon Kok Tiang is really engaging in a prior 
interpretation. If it subscribes to the contextual approach, this prior interpretation would 
                                                            
4 [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912–913. 
5 [1987] 1 WLR 841. 
6 [1997] AC 317 at 384. 
7 See, for eg, Static Control Components Ltd v Egan [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 429 at 435. 
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actually be an unrecognised (and perhaps unintentional) departure from that approach. 
There would be simultaneously a literal and contextual interpretation of the contract.8 
Secondly, the logical nexus between the threshold requirement and the aims of the 
contextual approach may require reconsideration. Contextual interpretation, as Lord 
Hoffmann said in Investors Compensation, is concerned with how a reasonable person 
would objectively perceive the meaning of the words with all the reasonably available 
background knowledge. If this is so, it would not matter whether that background knowledge 
(or context) is not clear or obvious; that should be a matter of the weight (as opposed to 
admissibility) which the court ascribes to such context, and should certainly not preclude the 
court from adopting a contextual meaning as opposed to the plain meaning.  
Thirdly and more fundamentally, the two aforementioned difficulties may represent a 
reluctance of the Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance to depart wholly from the traditional 
approach on fears of “uncertainty”, a concern that resonates similarly with the courts of 
other jurisdictions. In England, for example, Lord Hobhouse in Shogun Finance Ltd v 
Hudson9 referred to the rule that other evidence may not be adduced to contradict the 
provisions of a contract as the reason why English commercial law is preferred to other 
systems “which do not provide the same certainty”. In this regard, it is important to 
recognise that certainty is not an amorphous word incapable of precise meaning; on the 
contrary, it is submitted that it is important to realise which aspect of certainty is of concern. 
The present concern with certainty as guaranteed by the traditional approach is result-based: 
it focuses on the premise that the words of a contract, as understood by a reasonable person, 
will be conclusive of its meaning and hence yield consistent and predictable results. Yet, it 
does not recognise that even under the traditional (and objective) approach, the court may 
adopt different interpretations of the words as contained in the contract, simply because 
there is a range of acceptable, objective and reasonable meanings which a court can come to.  
This may mean that the certainty of real concern is not in the result, but in the approach. If 
this is correct, then it may be that the contextual approach, a method of interpretation as 
much as the traditional approach, will lead to “uncertainty”, as the Court of Appeal in Zurich 
Insurance (as well as the courts of other jurisdictions) has pointed out. The contextual 
approach, if applied consistently, will yield certainty in approach as much as the traditional 
approach. While it could lead to uncertain results, that is a result of the judicial decision-
making process rather than any inherent fault in the methodology. Therefore, the Court of 
Appeal’s concern with certainty in causing it to impose the “threshold requirement” may lead 
instead to uncertainty in that its adoption of the contextual approach may be incomplete and 
does not, as discussed, accord with the aims of that approach in ensuring that all background 
knowledge (or context), however unsatisfactory in quality, is made available to the court for 
its interpretation of the contract.  
Contractual interpretation in Singapore generally 
Thus the High Court’s approach in Soon Kok Tiang has provided perhaps some food for 
thought concerning the further refinement of contractual interpretation in Singapore. 
However, more generally speaking, the principles relating to contractual interpretation have 
been greatly improved in terms of both substance and clarity after Zurich Insurance.  
Indeed, while the Court of Appeal in Zurich Insurance might have implicitly displayed some 
reluctance in its adoption of the contextual approach, in a move which is as refreshing as it is 
bold, the Court departed from the present English position10 (reaffirmed by the House of 
                                                            
8 See further Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 12–14. 
9 [2004] 1 AC 919 at 944. 
10 Embodied in Investors and Full Metal Jacket Ltd v Gowlain Building Group [2005] EWCA Civ 1809. 
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Lords in Chartbrook v Persimmon Homes11) by accepting the possibility of admitting 
extrinsic evidence in the form of prior negotiations and subsequent conduct. Indeed, the 
predominant academic opinion seems to be that there is no reason why such extrinsic 
evidence should be excluded given that they legitimately form a part of the context from 
which contextual meaning can be ascertained.12 The traditional objection to the inclusion of 
such evidence is again premised on certainty.13 However, as regards the specific aspect of 
certainty of concern, the cases hint at the need to preserve certainty in result, which, as 
discussed, is difficult to guarantee. While the consideration of subsequent conduct may 
result in a different meaning being given to a contract as opposed to when such conduct is 
not considered, that does not mean that all certainty in the meaning of contracts is 
undermined. The meaning of contracts, whether or not subsequent conduct is considered, 
will always fluctuate depending on the particular judge interpreting it. Certainty in result can 
never be assured, but certainty in approach can be, and if the courts consistently consider 
subsequent conduct in pure pursuit of the contextual approach, then there is just as much 
possible certainty without and with the consideration of such extrinsic evidence. That may be 
the next step in the continued refinement of contractual interpretation in Singapore. 
                                                            
11 [2009] 3 WLR 267. 
12 See, eg, McMeel, “Prior Negotiations and Subsequent Conduct – The Next Step Forward for Contractual 
Interpretation” (2003) 119 LQR 272 and Nicholls, “My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words” (2005) 121 
LQR 577. 
13 See, eg, Full Metal Jacket at [17]. 
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